<PRE>


          SECTION 14. THE PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY CORPORATION

                                CONTENTS

Explanation of the Corporation and Its Functions
  Administration
  Plan Termination Insurance
  Plan Termination
Financial Condition of the PBGC
  Overview
  Claims from Underfunded Plans
  Financing
Budgetary Treatment
Future Financial Status of the PBGC
Legislative History
  Single-Employer Plans
  Multiemployer Plan Insurance Program

            EXPLANATION OF THE CORPORATION AND ITS FUNCTIONS

    The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) was
established under title IV of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) (88 Stat. 829, Public Law 93-406)
to insure private pension beneficiaries against the complete
loss of promised benefits if their defined benefit pension plan
is terminated without adequate funding. The PBGC receives no
funds from general tax revenues. Operations are financed by
insurance premiums set by Congress and paid by sponsors of
defined benefit plans, investment income, assets from pension
plans trusteed by PBGC, and recoveries from the companies
formerly responsible for the trusteed plans.

                             Administration

    The PBGC is a government-owned corporation. A three-member
board of directors, chaired by the Secretary of Labor,
administers the Corporation. The Secretary of Commerce and the
Secretary of the Treasury are the other directors. ERISA
provides for a seven-member Advisory Committee, appointed by
the President, for staggered 3 year terms. The Advisory
Committee advises the PBGC on issues such as the appointment of
trustees in termination proceedings, investment of funds, plan
liquidations, and other matters.

                       Plan Termination Insurance

Defined benefit and defined contribution plans
    There are two basic kinds of pension plans: ``defined
benefit'' and ``defined contribution'' plans. Under a defined
benefit plan, employees receive a fixed benefit at retirement
prescribed by a formula set forth in the plan. The employer
makes annual contributions to the plan based on actuarial
calculations designed to ensure that the plan has sufficient
funds to pay the benefit prescribed by the formula. Under a
defined contribution plan, no particular benefit is promised.
Instead, benefits are based on the balance of an individual
account maintained for the benefit of the employee. The benefit
received by an employee at retirement is generally dependent on
two factors: total contributions made to the plan on the
employee's behalf during the employee's participation in the
plan, and the investment experience of the amounts contributed
on the employee's behalf. Under either type of pension plan,
employees may also be permitted to make contributions.
    Under a defined contribution plan, the employee bears all
the risk of poor investment performance of the assets invested
in a plan. Whether the funds are invested well or poorly, the
employee gets at retirement only what was contributed plus the
amount actually earned.
    Under a defined benefit plan, the employer bears more of
the risk of loss. The Internal Revenue Code and ERISA contain
minimum funding standards that require the employer to make
contributions to a defined benefit plan to fund promised
benefits. Thus, for example, if the plan experiences poor
investment performance, actuarial miscalculations, or low
benefit estimates, the employer will be required to make
additional contributions to the plan. However, the minimum
funding rules provide for funding over a period of time, and do
not require that the plan have assets to pay all the benefits
earned under the plan at any particular time. Thus, it is
possible for a defined benefit plan to terminate without having
sufficient assets to pay promised benefits. The PBGC insures
defined benefit plan benefits up to certain limits to protect
plan participants in the event of such a termination. However,
the PBGC may not protect all benefits promised under a plan so
that even under a defined benefit plan, the employees bear some
risk of loss.
    Defined benefit plans are fewer in number than defined
contribution plans, but cover about the same number of
participants. Defined benefit pension plans account for about
10 percent of all pension plans, but are the primary form of
coverage for about half of all pension participants.
    The PBGC insures benefits only under certain defined
benefit plans and only up to certain monthly amounts. Private
defined benefit pension plans insured by the PBGC continue to
be well funded in general, with more than $1.43 trillion in
assets, exceeding liability by $32 billion as of the beginning
of 1996. However, PBGC faces direct exposure from underfunded
plans. PBGC reported $83 billion in pension underfunding in
single-employer plans as of the beginning of 1996. Underfunding
in multiemployer plans, as of January 1, 1996 (the most recent
publicly available information) totaled $40.0 billion. The
operations of the insurance program, and insurance limits, are
described below. Defined contribution plans are not insured by
the PBGC.
Single-employer and multiemployer plans
    Defined benefit plans insured by the PBGC fall into two
categories: single-employer plans and multiemployer plans.
Multiemployer plans are collectively bargained arrangements
maintained by more than one employer. Single-employer plans,
whether or not collectively bargained, are each maintained by
one employer. Non-collectively-bargained plans maintained by
more than one employer are classified as single-employer plans.
    The risk to the PBGC posed by single-employer plans is
different from that posed by multiemployer plans. Generally,
single-employer plans are more vulnerable to the risk of
underfunding due to financial weakness of the sponsoring
employer; the PBGC is more vulnerable to the risk that a single
employer will be unable to make up the difference between
funded and promised benefits. Issues concerning insurance of
multiemployer plans are more likely to concern the allocation
of liabilities as firms enter and leave the participating
group.
    The PBGC insures the benefits of 42 million pension plan
participants, including active workers and retirees. Of these,
79 percent, or about 33 million, are covered by approximately
42,000 single-employer pension plans, and 21 percent, or about
8.8 million, are covered by approximately 2,000 multiemployer
plans.
Other requirements for PBGC coverage
    The PBGC covers only those defined benefit plans that meet
the qualification requirements of section 401 of the Internal
Revenue Code. These are also the requirements that plans must
meet in order to receive the significant tax benefits available
to qualified pension plans.
    Generally, to be qualified under the Internal Revenue Code,
a pension plan must be established with the intent of being a
permanent and continuing arrangement; must provide definitely
determinable benefits; may not discriminate in favor of highly
compensated employees with respect to coverage, contributions
or benefits; and must cover a minimum number or percentage of
employees.
    Pension plans specifically excluded from insurance by the
PBGC include government and church plans, defined contribution
plans, plans of fraternal societies financed entirely by member
contributions, plans maintained by certain professionals with
25 or fewer participants, and plans established and maintained
exclusively for substantial owners.

                            Plan Termination

Single-employer plans
    An employer can voluntarily terminate a single-employer
plan only in a standard or distress termination. The
participants and the PBGC must be notified of the termination.
The PBGC may involuntarily terminate a plan.
    Standard terminations.--A standard termination is permitted
only if plan assets are sufficient to cover benefit
liabilities. Generally, benefit liabilities equal all benefits
earned to date by plan participants, including vested and
nonvested benefits (which automatically become vested at the
time of termination), and including certain early retirement
supplements and subsidies. Benefit liabilities may also include
certain contingent benefits (for example, plant shutdown
benefits). If assets are sufficient to cover benefit
liabilities (and other termination requirements, such as notice
to employees, have not been violated), the plan distributes
benefits to participants. The plan provides for the benefit
payments it owes by purchasing annuity contracts from an
insurance company, or otherwise providing for the payment of
benefits, for example, by providing the benefits in lump sum
distributions.
    Assets in excess of the amounts necessary to cover benefit
liabilities may be recovered by the employer in an asset
reversion. The asset reversion is included in the gross income
of the employer and is also subject to a nondeductible excise
tax. The excise tax is 20 percent of the amount of the
reversion if the employer establishes a qualified replacement
plan, or provides certain benefit increases in connection with
the termination. Otherwise, the excise tax is 50 percent of the
reversion amount.
    Distress terminations.--If assets in the plan are not
sufficient to cover benefit liabilities, the employer may not
terminate the plan unless the employer meets one of four
criteria necessary for a ``distress'' termination:
  --The contributing sponsor, and every member of the
        controlled group of which the sponsor is a member, is
        being liquidated in bankruptcy or any similar Federal
        law or other similar State insolvency proceedings;
  --The contributing sponsor and every member of the sponsor's
        controlled group is being reorganized in bankruptcy or
        similar State proceeding;
  --The PBGC determines that termination is necessary to allow
        the employer to pay its debts when due; or
  --The PBGC determines that termination is necessary to avoid
        unreasonably burdensome pension costs caused solely by
        a decline in the employer's work force.
    These requirements, added by the Single Employer Pension
Plan Amendments Act of 1986 (SEPPAA) and modified by the
Pension Protection Act of 1987 (PPA), and the Retirement
Protection Act of 1994 (RPA) are designed to ensure that the
liabilities of an underfunded plan remain the responsibility of
the employer, rather than the PBGC, unless the employer meets
strict standards of financial need indicating genuine inability
to continue funding the plan.
    Involuntary terminations.--In order to terminate a plan
involuntarily, the PBGC must obtain a court order. The PBGC may
institute court proceedings only if the plan in question has
not met the minimum funding standards, will be unable to pay
benefits when due, has a substantial owner who has received a
distribution greater than $10,000 (other than by reason of
death), or may create liability for the PBGC if the plan is not
terminated. The PBGC must terminate a plan if the plan is
unable to pay benefits that are currently due. A court may
order termination of the plan in order to protect the interests
of participants, to avoid unreasonable deterioration of the
plan's financial condition, or to avoid an unreasonable
increase in the PBGC liability under the plan.
    PBGC trusteeship.--When an underfunded plan terminates in a
distress or involuntary termination, the plan effectively goes
into PBGC receivership. The PBGC becomes the trustee of the
plan, takes control of any plan assets, and assumes
responsibility for liabilities under the plan. The PBGC makes
payments for benefit liabilities promised under the plan with
assets received from two sources: assets in the plan before
termination, and assets recovered from employers. The balance,
if any, of guaranteed benefits owed to beneficiaries is paid
from the PBGC's revolving funds (see below).
    Employer liability to the PBGC.--Following a distress or
involuntary termination, the plan's contributing sponsor and
every member of that sponsor's controlled group is liable to
the PBGC for the excess of the value of the plan's liabilities
as of the date of plan termination over the fair market value
of the plan's assets on the date of termination. The liability
is joint and several, meaning that each member of the
controlled group can be held responsible for the entire
liability. Generally, the obligation is payable in cash or
negotiable securities to the PBGC on the date of termination.
Failure to pay this amount upon demand by the PBGC may trigger
a lien on the property of the contributing employer's
controlled group for up to 30 percent of its net worth.
Obligations in excess of this amount are to be paid on
commercially reasonable terms acceptable to the PBGC.
    Benefit payments.--When an underfunded plan terminates, the
benefits that the PBGC will pay depend on the statutory
guaranty, asset allocation, and recovery on the PBGC's employer
liability claim.
    Guaranteed benefits.--Within certain limits, the PBGC
guarantees any retirement benefit that was nonforfeitable
(vested) on the date of plan termination other than benefits
that vest solely on account of the termination, and any death,
survivor or disability benefit that was owed or was in payment
status at the date of plan termination. Generally only that
part of the retirement benefit that is payable in monthly
installments (rather than, for example, lump sum benefits
payable to encourage early retirement) is guaranteed.
Retirement benefits that commence before the normal age of
retirement are guaranteed, provided they meet the other
conditions of guarantee. Contingent benefits (for example,
early retirement benefits provided only if a plant shuts down)
are guaranteed only if the triggering event occurs before plan
termination.
    There is a statutory ceiling on the amount of monthly
benefits payable to any individual that may be guaranteed. This
ceiling, which is indexed according to changes in the Social
Security wage base, is $3,221.59 for the year 2000 for a single
life annuity payable at age 65. This limit is actuarially
reduced for benefits payable before age 65, or payable in a
different form.
    The reduction in the maximum guarantee for benefits paid
before age 65 is 7 percent for each of the first 5 years under
age 65, 4 percent for each of the next 5 years, and 2 percent
for each of the next 10 years. The reduction in the maximum
guarantee for benefits paid in a form other than a single life
annuity depends on the type of benefit, and if there is a
survivor's benefit, the percentage of the benefit continuing to
the surviving spouse and the age difference between the
participant and spouse.
    For example, consider a retiree who, at plan termination in
2000, is age 60 and whose spouse is 2 years younger. The
participant is receiving a joint and 50 percent survivor's
benefit (a benefit that continues to a surviving spouse upon
the death of the participant at a reduced level of 50 percent).
In this case, the maximum guarantee applicable to the
participant is $1,846.94 per month [$3,221.59 <greek-e> 0.90 (
joint and survivor benefit) <greek-e> 0.65 (participant age)
<greek-e> 0.98 (spouse 2 years younger)].
    The guarantee for any new benefit, including benefits under
new plans and benefits provided by amendment to already
existing plans, is phased in over 5 years following creation of
the benefit.
    Asset allocation.--Assets of a terminated plan are
allocated to pay benefits according to a priority schedule
established by statute. Under this schedule, some nonguaranteed
benefits are payable from plan assets before certain guaranteed
benefits. For example, certain benefits that have been in pay
status for more than 3 years have priority over guaranteed
benefits not in pay status.
    Section 4022(c) benefits.--The PBGC is also required to pay
participants a portion of their unfunded, nonguaranteed
benefits based on a ratio of recovery on the employer liability
claim to the amount of that claim.
    As a result of the asset allocation and section 4022(c)
benefits, reimbursement to the PBGC for its payment of
guaranteed benefits may be less than the total value of assets
recovered from the terminated plan.
Multiemployer plans
    In the case of multiemployer plans, the PBGC insures plan
insolvency, rather than plan termination. Accordingly, a
multiemployer plan need not be terminated to qualify for PBGC
financial assistance, but must be found to be insolvent. A plan
is insolvent when its available resources are not sufficient to
pay the plan benefits for the plan year in question, or when
the sponsor of a plan in reorganization reasonably determines,
taking into account the plan's recent and anticipated financial
experience, that the plan's available resources will not be
sufficient to pay benefits that come due in the next plan year.
    If it appears that available resources will not support the
payment of benefits at the guaranteed level, the PBGC will
provide the additional resources needed as a loan. The PBGC may
provide loans to the plan year after year. If the plan recovers
from insolvency, it must begin repaying loans on reasonable
terms in accordance with regulations.
    The PBGC guarantees benefits under a multiemployer plan of
the same type as those guaranteed under a single-employer plan,
but a different guarantee ceiling applies. As a result of the
Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980 (Public Law
96-364, referred to as MPPAA), the limit for multiemployer
plans is the sum of 100 percent of the first $5 of monthly
benefits per year of credited service, and 75 percent of the
next $15 of monthly benefits. (The 75 percent is reduced to 65
percent for plans that do not meet certain pre-ERISA minimum
funding standards.)
    MPPAA requires that PBGC conduct a study every 5 years to
determine whether changes are needed in the multiemployer
premium rate or guarantee. PBGC completed the third such study
in 1996, confirming the program's financial solvency, but also
finding that inflation had devalued the existing guarantee
limits. In 1999 the Clinton administration proposed to increase
the guarantee limits for the multiemployer program to account
for inflation since 1980. A similar proposal was made in
previous years by the Clinton administration and in 1991 by the
Bush administration.

                    FINANCIAL CONDITION OF THE PBGC

                                Overview

    According to its most recent annual report, the PBGC's
multiemployer plan insurance program is in sound financial
condition. Assets exceeded liabilities by $341 million at the
end of fiscal year 1998.
    By the end of fiscal year 1998, the larger single-employer
program was showing an accumulated surplus of $5.0 billion.
That is, the assets in PBGC's single-employer program were $5.0
billion greater than the value of PBGC's liability for future
benefit payments. PBGC's assets are comprised of premiums
collected, assets recovered from terminated plans and
recoveries from employers, and accumulated investment income.
PBGC's liability for future benefit payments is the
(discounted) present value of the stream of future benefit
payments PBGC is obligated to pay participants and
beneficiaries of terminated plans and plans booked as probable
terminations. This is the third surplus in PBGC's history and
provides a reserve against future claims.

                     Claims from Underfunded Plans

    Through the end of fiscal year 1998, the PBGC's single-
employer program had incurred net claims of $6.7 billion (see
table 14-1). PBGC's net claims equal the portion of guaranteed
benefit liabilities not covered by plan assets or recoverable
employer liability. These claims will eventually have to be
covered through premiums, earnings on PBGC assets, or other
sources of revenues.
    The claims against PBGC have increased considerably over
its history. Within that trend, there has been substantial
annual variability due to the sporadic terminations of very
large underfunded plans.
     Table 14-1 demonstrates the growth in net claims over the
Corporation's history. In the 8 years from 1991 to 1998, net
claims, not including probable terminations, exceeded those of
the prior 8 years by 53 percent and were more than four times
greater than the net claims from the first 8 years of PBGC's
operation. PBGC also faces probable net claims of $1.426
billion for 25 plans that are expected to terminate after
fiscal year 1998.

     TABLE 14-1.--CLAIM EXPERIENCE FROM SINGLE-EMPLOYER PLANS, 1975-98 AND PROBABLE FUTURE TERMINATIONS \1\
                                              [Dollars in millions]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                        Average
                                                                        Trust   Recoveries             net claim
              Year of termination                 Number    Benefit     plan       from        Net        per
                                                 of plans  liability   assets    employers   claims   terminated
                                                                                                         plan
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1975-82........................................       958     $1,194      $439       $175       $581       $0.6
1983-90........................................       883      3,041       983        213      1,845        2.1
1991-98........................................       814      6,357     3,143        389      2,825        4.1
                                                ----------------------------------------------------------------
    Subtotal...................................     2,655     10,592     4,565        777      5,250        2.0
Probable future terminations...................        25      3,309     1,715        168      1,426  ..........
                                                ----------------------------------------------------------------
    Total......................................     2,680     13,901     6,280        945      6,676  ..........
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Stated amounts are subject to change until PBGC finalizes values for liabilities, assets, and recoveries of
  terminated plans. Amounts in this table are valued as of the date of each plan's termination and differ from
  amounts reported in PBGC's Financial Statements which are valued as of the end of the stated fiscal year.

Note.--Numbers may not add up to totals due to rounding.

Source: Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.

    As shown by table 14-2, the number of single-employer plan
terminations that result in claims against the PBGC is a tiny
fraction of all plan terminations. Over the past two decades
terminations of underfunded plans made up less than 2 percent
of all terminations. PBGC's surplus in the single-employer
program at the end of fiscal year 1998 was $5.0 billion, its
third surplus ever.

                               Financing

    The sources of financing for PBGC are per-participant
premiums collected from insured plans, assets in terminated
underfunded plans for which the PBGC has become trustee,
investment earnings, and amounts owed to the PBGC by employers
who have terminated underfunded plans. In addition, PBGC has
the authority to borrow up to $100 million from the Treasury.
Single-employer premiums
    An employer that maintains a covered single-employer
defined benefit pension plan must pay an annual premium for
each participant under the plan. Initially set at $1 per
participant, the per-participant premium was raised to $2.60
beginning in 1979, and then raised again by SEPPAA to $8.50
beginning in 1986. The PPA, contained in the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1987, raised the basic premium to $16,
and imposed an additional variable rate, or risk-related,
premium on underfunded plans. The variable rate premium was
initially set at $6 per each $1,000 of the plan's unfunded
vested benefits, up to a maximum of $34 per participant.
Accordingly, the maximum premium was $50 per participant.
    The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 (OBRA 1990)
increased the basic premium to $19, and the variable rate
premium to $9 per each $1,000 of the plan's unfunded vested
benefits, up to a maximum of $53 per participant. Thus,
beginning in 1991, the maximum premium was $72 per participant.
OBRA 1990 did not change the ratio of revenue raised by the
basic and variable rate portions of the premium.

TABLE 14-2.--TOTAL NUMBER OF TERMINATED SINGLE-EMPLOYER PLANS, NUMBER OF
        PLANS WITH CLAIMS AGAINST PBGC, AND NET POSITION, 1975-98
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                  Net
                                                               position
                                       Number of   Number of   at end of
             Fiscal year              terminated    claims       year
                                         plans      against    (millions
                                                     PBGC         of
                                                               dollars)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1975................................       2,570         100       -15.7
1976................................       9,103         171       -41.0
1977................................       7,332         130       -95.3
1978................................       5,261         103      -137.8
1979................................       4,892          82      -146.4
1980................................       4,037         104       -94.6
1981................................       5,086         137      -188.8
1982................................       6,134         131      -332.8
1983................................       6,879         149      -523.3
1984................................       7,720          99      -462.0
1985................................       8,750         115    -1,325.3
1986................................       6,961         132    -3,826.4
1987................................      10,970         105    -1,548.5
1988................................      10,889          99    -1,543.3
1989................................      11,484          84    -1,123.6
1990................................      11,900         100    -1,912.8
1991................................       8,768         168    -2,510.0
1992................................       6,820         150    -2,737.1
1993................................       5,437         117    -2,897.0
1994................................       4,073         123    -1,240.0
1995................................       3,977         107      -315.0
1996................................       3,885          76      +869.0
1997................................       3,547          50      +3,481
1998................................       2,498          23      +5,012
                                     -----------------------------------
    Total...........................     158,973       2,655  ..........
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.

    The RPA did not change the $19 basic per participant
premium. However, the $53 per participant variable rate premium
cap was phased out over a 3-year period beginning in 1994. The
variable rate premium is now completely uncapped. RPA also
changed the way underfunding is calculated. Effective for 1995
plan years, liabilities have to be calculated using a standard
mortality table. Effective for plan years beginning on or after
July 1, 1997, liabilities are calculated using an interest rate
of 85 percent of the spot rate for 30-year Treasury securities
(an increase from the current 80 percent). In the future, plans
will be required to use a new mortality table to be prescribed
by the Secretary of Treasury for certain funding purposes. At
that time the interest rate will rise to 100 percent of the
Treasury spot rate and a requirement to use fair market value
of plan assets (rather than actuarial value) will become
effective.
    PBGC's single-employer premium income equaled $966 million
in 1998.
Multiemployer plan premiums
    The premium for multiemployer plans was initially $0.50 per
participant. The MPPAA raised the premium to $1.40 for years
after 1980. This premium was set to increase gradually to its
current level, $2.60. PBGC's multiemployer premium income
equaled $23 million in 1998.
Assets from terminated plans
    When the PBGC becomes trustee of a terminated plan, it
receives control of any assets in the plan. These assets are
placed in one of two trust funds (one for multiemployer plans,
one for single-employer plans).
Employer liability
    An employer that terminates an underfunded defined benefit
plan is liable to the PBGC for certain amounts. Before the
changes made by SEPPAA, an employer's liability was generally
capped at 30 percent of the employer's net worth. SEPPAA
removed this limit, leaving employers whose liability would
have been capped liable for an additional share of unfunded
benefit commitments above 30 percent of net worth. The PPA
further increased employer liability, leaving employers liable
for all amounts up to 100 percent of unfunded benefit
liabilities.
Investment income
    The PBGC maintains two separate financial programs, each
consisting of a revolving fund and a trust fund, to sustain its
single-employer and multiemployer plan insurance programs. Its
revolving funds consist of collected premiums and income
resulting from investment of the premiums. The revolving funds
had a value of $11.6 billion as of September 30, 1998.
    The trust funds consist of assets received from all
terminated plans of which the PBGC is or will be a trustee, and
employer liability payments. These assets are invested in a
diversified portfolio of investments including equities, fixed
income securities, and real estate. The net market value of the
trust funds was $6.5 billion as of September 30, 1998.
    Chart 14-1 diagrams the relationship between the PBGC's
financing and its payment of guaranteed benefits to plan
participants.

    CHART 14-1. FINANCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY
                              CORPORATION

<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>

    Source: Congressional Budget Office.

                          BUDGETARY TREATMENT

    Since 1981, administrative expenses of the PBGC and the
benefit payments to participants in plans under the PBGC's
trusteeship have been counted as Federal outlays. Certain
receipts of the agency--including premium payments, interest on
balances in the revolving fund, and transfers to the revolving
fund from the trust fund--offset PBGC expenses in the Federal
budget. Liabilities for future benefit payments and other
accruals are not taken into account. In each year since 1981
(when the program was first included in the Federal budget) the
effect of the PBGC has been to reduce overall Federal outlays
(see table 14-3). During this period, the PBGC reported
receipts in excess of benefit payments and administrative costs
by a cumulative total of about $8.4 billion. In years before
1981, Federal accounts for the PBGC would also have shown
annual inflows exceeding expenses in each year of program
operation.

                  FUTURE FINANCIAL STATUS OF THE PBGC

    PBGC reported $83 billion in pension underfunding in
single-employer plans as of January 1, 1996. Multiemployer
plans represent $40.0 billion in underfunding as of January 1,
1996.
    Not all pension underfunding represents likely claims upon
PBGC's insurance. PBGC's analyses disclose reasonably possible
losses of about $15 to $17 billion as of December 31, 1997,
compared to the previous year's projection of $21 billion.

TABLE 14-3.--FEDERAL BUDGETARY TREATMENT OF THE PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY
                          CORPORATION, 1975-98
                        [In millions of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                               Outlays
                                                              appearing
         Fiscal year          Expenses \1\     Offsetting      in  the
                                            collections \2\    Federal
                                                              budget \3\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Not included in the Federal budget \4\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1975........................        $3.2           $35.5              NA
1976........................        12.8            28.5              NA
1977........................        21.0            41.0              NA
1978........................        47.6            61.9              NA
1979........................        52.3            91.5              NA
1980........................        59.1            90.1              NA
                             -------------------------------------------
    Total...................       196.0           348.5              NA
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                   Included in the Federal budget \4\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1981........................          79             123            -$29
1982........................         104             157             -67
1983........................         161             182             -10
1984........................         180             190             -10
1985........................         195             210             -19
1986........................         272             344            -106
1987........................         509             637             -72
1988........................         489             560            -278
1989........................         780           1,190            -149
1990........................         745           1,175            -680
1991........................         599           1,339            -787
1992........................         766           1,491            -655
1993........................         833           2,323          -1,508
1994........................       1,017           1,446            -385
1995........................         872           1,716            -430
1996........................       1,011           1,812            -851
1997........................         930           2,147          -1,197
1998........................       1,001           2,252          -1,218
                             -------------------------------------------
    Total...................      10,544          19,287          -8,450
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Includes primarily administrative costs and benefit payments.
\2\ Includes primarily premium income, interest income, and transfers
  from the pension insurance trust fund to the revolving fund.
\3\ Outlays do not equal the difference between expenses and offsetting
  collections because of changes in obligated program balances between
  the beginning and the end of the fiscal year.
\4\ The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation was first included in the
  Federal budget in 1981, in accordance with Public Law 96-364.

NA--Not applicable.

Note.--This table includes both the single-employer and multiemployer
  pension insurance programs.

Source: Congressional Budget Office using data from the appendix to the
  Federal budget, various years.

    The future financial condition of the pension insurance
program is highly uncertain because it depends largely on how
many private pension plans terminate and on the amount of
underfunding in those plans. Both factors are hard to forecast
accurately. Moreover, as was discussed above, a few pension
plans with extremely large unfunded liabilities have dominated
the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation's (PBGC) past claims,
and its future may likewise depend significantly on the fate of
a few large plans, making liabilities even more difficult to
predict. Future terminations will probably be influenced by
overall economic conditions, by the prosperity of particular
industries, by competition from abroad, and by a variety of
factors that are specific to particular firms--such as their
competitive position in the industry, their agreements with
labor groups, and the assessments of their financial prospects
that are necessary to obtain credit. In addition, PBGC's losses
with respect to future terminations will depend on how well
companies fund their plans, and on the PBGC's position in
bankruptcy proceedings.
    In its fiscal year 1998 annual report, PBGC presented a new
methodology for analyzing long-term claims exposure. The PBGC's
new methodology uses a stochastic model called the Pension
Insurance Modeling System (PIMS). PIMS evaluates PBGC's
exposure under current pension funding rules as a function of a
variety of economic parameters. The model recognizes the
uncertainty in companies' chances of future bankruptcy and the
uncertainty in key economic parameters (particularly interest
rates and stock returns). It simulates the claims that could
develop under thousands of combinations of economic parameters
and bankruptcy rates.
    Using the model, PBGC estimates median claims over the next
10 years will be about $600 million per year (in present value
terms); that is, half of the scenarios show claims above $600
million per year and half below. The mean (average) level of
claims is much higher, more than $900 million per year, because
there is a chance under some scenarios that claims could reach
very high levels. For example, PIMS estimates a 10 percent
chance that claims could exceed $2.1 billion per year.
    PIMS projects PBGC's potential future financial position by
combining simulated claims with simulated premiums, expenses,
and investment returns. The median outcome is an $11.1 billion
surplus in 2008 (in present value terms), while the mean
outcome is an $8.8 billion surplus. However, the model also
shows the potential for significant downside outcomes. In
particular, it estimates nearly a 20 percent chance that the
agency could return to a deficit in the next 10 years, and a 10
percent chance that the deficit could exceed $6.3 billion in
2008 (in present value terms). These adverse outcomes are most
likely if the economy performs poorly, in which case PBGC may
experience both large claims and investment losses.
    PBGC's fiscal year 1998 report also presented three
forecasts under its former methodology, which relied on an
extrapolation of the agency's claims experience and the
economic conditions of the past two decades. The report
presented three different forecasts of future claims and
resulting deficits and surpluses to indicate the potential
variability of its financial condition. Forecast A is based on
the average annual net claim over the entire PBGC history ($527
million per year) and projects a surplus of $11.5 billion by
the end of fiscal year 2008 ($6.6 billion in present value
terms for comparison to PIMS). Forecast B is based on the
average annual net claim for the most recent 11 fiscal years
($611 million per year). Under forecast B, PBGC projects a
surplus of $10.5 billion by the end of fiscal year 2008 ($6.0
billion in present value terms). Forecast C assumes $1.5
billion of net claims each year and assumes the termination of
all plans that represent reasonably possible losses over the
next 10 years. Under forecast C, PBGC projects a deficit of
$2.5 billion by the end of fiscal year 2008 ($1.4 billion in
present value terms).

                          LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

                         Single-Employer Plans

    The PBGC was established under the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) for the purpose of insuring
benefits under defined benefit pension plans. As originally
structured, in the case of a single-employer plan, termination
of a plan triggered the PBGC insurance mechanism. The
contributing employer was liable to the PBGC for unfunded
insured benefits up to 30 percent of the net worth of the
employer. If unfunded insured liability exceeded this amount,
the PBGC had to absorb the excess and spread the loss over
insured plans. Employers generally faced no restrictions on
their ability to terminate an underfunded plan.
The Single Employer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1986 (SEPPAA)
    Congress passed SEPPAA (enacted as title XI of the
Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (Public
Law 99-272)) in response to rapidly growing PBGC deficits.
SEPPAA raised the per-participant premium from $2.60 to $8.50,
established certain financial distress criteria that a
sponsoring employer and every member of the employer's
controlled group must meet in order to terminate an underfunded
plan, expanded PBGC's employer liability claim, and created a
new liability to plan participants for certain nonguaranteed
benefits.
Pension Protection Act of 1987
    In 1987 Congress passed the Pension Protection Act of 1987
(PPA; as part of Public Law 100-203) which contained additional
measures to strengthen PBGC's long-term solvency. The act
increased PBGC's basic per participant premium for single-
employer plans to $16 and added a variable rate premium for
these plans tied to the degree of plan underfunding (capped at
$53 per participant). The act also expanded PBGC's employer
liability claim to include all plan benefit liabilities,
provided that PBGC share a portion of its recoveries from
employers with plan participants, and required faster funding
of plan benefits to reduce PBGC's exposure in the event of plan
termination. The act also contained other provisions relating
to the plan termination distress criteria, the bankruptcy
treatment of unpaid employer contributions, PBGC's lien
authority, and various pension funding requirements.
Retirement Protection Act of 1994 (RPA)
    In response to the persistent growth in pension
underfunding, Congress passed significant reforms in RPA
(enacted December 8, 1994) as part of the GATT legislation (the
Uruguay round Agreements (Public Law 103-465)). RPA provisions
include:
 1. Minimum funding standards.--RPA strengthened the pension
        funding rules for underfunded plans by accelerating
        funding, eliminating double counting of certain funding
        credits, and constraining the assumptions that may be
        used to calculate pension contributions. RPA also
        required severely underfunded plans to maintain minimum
        levels of liquid assets. RPA contained certain
        transition rules limiting annual increases in pension
        contributions. In addition, RPA repealed the quarterly
        funding requirement for fully funded plans and granted
        excise tax relief for employers with both defined
        benefit and defined contribution plans.
 2. Variable rate premium.--RPA phased out the $53 per
        participant cap on the variable rate premium over a 3-
        year period as an incentive to improve funding in
        underfunded plans and made certain changes to the
        interest rate and mortality assumptions used to
        calculate plan underfunding.
 3. Reporting to PBGC.--RPA requires sponsors with over $50
        million in underfunding to provide PBGC detailed
        actuarial information on underfunded plans and detailed
        company financial information. It also requires
        privately-held companies with over $50 million in
        underfunding and an aggregate funding ratio of less
        than 90 percent to provide advance notice to PBGC of
        certain corporate transactions.
 4. Disclosure to participants in underfunded plans.--RPA
        requires most employers whose plans are less than 90
        percent funded to provide a notice to participants
        regarding the funding status of the plan and the
        limitations of PBGC's guarantee of participants'
        benefit.
 5. Missing participants program.--RPA established a program
        under which PBGC serves as a clearinghouse for benefits
        of missing participants in plans terminating in a
        standard (fully funded) termination.
    RPA contained other provisions relating to enforcement of
minimum funding requirements, PBGC liens for missed pension
contributions, and limitation of benefit increases while a
company is in bankruptcy.

                  Multiemployer Plan Insurance Program

    Coverage for multiemployer plans under ERISA was structured
similarly to that of single-employer plans. However, the PBGC
was not required to insure benefits of multiemployer plans that
terminated before July 1, 1978. Congress extended the deadline
for mandatory pension coverage several times, until enactment
of the MPPAA (Public Law 96-364). MPPAA required more complete
funding for multiemployer plans, especially those in financial
distress. It also improved the ability of plans to collect
contributions from employers. MPPAA changed the insurable event
that triggers PBGC protection to plan insolvency, rather than
plan termination. Thus, if a multiemployer plan becomes
financially unable to pay benefits at the guaranteed level when
due, the PBGC will provide financial assistance to the plan, in
the form of a loan. Finally, MPPAA imposed withdrawal liability
on employers who ceased to contribute to a multiemployer plan.</pre>

